Legal News & Articles

Holmes’ residence was damaged by fire. Auto Owners insured the property. Auto Owners hired an investigator who concluded that Holmes had intentionally set the fire. When Holmes sued for bad faith, Auto Owner moved for summary judgment. Auto owners argued that Holmes had initially refused to submit to an examination under oath, and that when he did eventually agree to do so, he refused to produce financial documents requested by Auto Owners, including his personal tax returns and financial information about his business. Holmes argued that the policy’s cooperation provision was ambiguous, in that it did not specify a time frame for compliance with the insurer’s requests.

The Wisconsin Defense Counsel Civil Trial Journal editor, Andrew Hebl, is looking for articles for the 2012 Spring issue of the Journal. Submissions are due by March 1, 2012.


Here are links to last week's cases in html and pdf.

The plaintiffs’ attorney filed a signed copy of a summons and complaint with the circuit court to commence the action, and at the same time had several unsigned copies of the summons and complaint authenticated by the circuit court. One of those unsigned copies was then served upon the defendant. The defendant moved for dismissal, arguing that service of an unsigned, but authenticated, summons and complaint was a fundamental defect that deprived the circuit court of jurisdiction. The plaintiffs asserted that the defect was merely technical, as a signed copy had been filed with the court and the unsigned authenticated copy served upon the defendant gave the defendant appropriate notice of the claim. The circuit court denied the defendant’s motion, and the defendant sought an interlocutory appeal with the court of appeals.

The plaintiffs sued the defendants for injuries sustained in an auto accident. The defendant driver, Kuester, did not have insurance, but an insurer, Tokio Marine, insured the leasing company of Kuester’s vehicle. Tokio Marine moved for summary judgment, arguing that it did not provide any coverage for the plaintiffs’ claimed damages. The plaintiffs also moved for summary judgment, arguing that Tokio Marine provided coverage for their injuries and that the policy limit available to them was $5 million. The circuit court held that Tokio Marine provided coverage for the plaintiffs’ injures but that the policy limit was $50,000 per occurrence. The parties then stipulated that Tokio Marine could be dismissed from the case upon payment of $50,000 to the court, conditional upon resolution of an appeal of the coverage issue. The stipulation also specified that, if the court of appeals found coverage of greater than $50,000 per occurrence, Tokio Marine could contest the amount of negligence attributable to Kuester and the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiffs. In the event the court of appeals found coverage of $50,000 or less, or no coverage, Tokio Marine would be dismissed.

The plaintiff sued the defendant for rescission of a contract between it and the defendant, and for damages, arising from a dispute involving interpretation of terms of a contract between it and the defendant. Just prior to trial, the plaintiff attempted to amend its complaint to state a claim for false advertising under Wis. Stat. §100.18. By this time, more than three years had elapsed since the entering of the contract. The defendant argued that the false advertising claim did not relate back because the plaintiff had not given notice in its initial complaint of specific statements intended to induce the plaintiff to enter into the contract. The circuit court agreed with the defendant and dismissed the false advertising claim, and the plaintiff appealed.

The plaintiff company and some of its owners sued the defendant co-owner, who counterclaimed against the plaintiffs, and the case proceeded to trial. A jury awarded the defendant $736,000 in compensatory damages and $5,000,000 in punitive damages against one of the plaintiffs. The plaintiff against whom the damages were awarded then filed a motion after verdict, seeking reduction of the punitive damage award, but the motion filing was one day late. The circuit court nevertheless considered the motion and reduced the punitive damages award. The defendant appealed to the court of appeals, which reversed the circuit court, and the plaintiff petitioned for review with the Wisconsin Supreme Court.

Here are links to last week's cases in html and pdf.

A worker, Swenson, sustained a work injury and was returned to work at full duty after he recovered. The employer, DeBoer Transportation, required him to complete a road test as a condition for re-employment, which he refused on the grounds that he needed to care for his ailing father at night. The employer terminated Swenson for refusing to complete the road test, and Swenson then sought an unreasonable refusal to rehire penalty against the employer pursuant to Wis. Stat. §102.35(3). The Labor and Industry Review Commission (“LIRC”) held that the employer did not demonstrate that accommodating Swenson would have compromised safety or been a financial burden and, therefore, failed to show “reasonable cause” for its refusal to rehire him, as required by §102.35(3). The employer appealed, the circuit court affirmed, and the employer appealed to the court of appeals. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the LIRC relied upon an incorrect interpretation of the reasonable cause standard in Wis. Stat. §102.35(3). Swenson then appealed to the Wisconsin supreme court.

The plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit against numerous automobile manufacturers, including Nissan Motor Company (“Nissan Japan”) and Nissan North America, Inc. (“Nissan North America”). Nissan Japan moved to dismiss the complaint against it for lack of personal jurisdiction, arguing that it did not engage in any activities in Wisconsin, that Nissan Japan and Nissan North America are separate and distinct corporate entities with their own employees, facilities and records, and that Nissan North America was not an agent or instrumentality of Nissan Japan. The plaintiff opposed the motion, asserting that Nissan North America was an agent of Nissan Japan under the definition of “manufacturer” in Wisconsin’s Lemon Law, Wis. Stat. §218.0171, and that under the alter-ego theory of jurisdiction Nissan Japan had sufficient control over Nissan North America to warrant personal jurisdiction against Nissan Japan. The circuit court agreed with Nissan Japan, holding that Nissan Japan had not exercised sufficient control over Nissan North America, and that corporate formalities had not been disregarded such that the corporate veil could be pierced against Nissan Japan. The circuit court dismissed Nissan Japan and the plaintiff appealed to the court of appeals, which affirmed the circuit court, and the plaintiff petitioned for review with the Wisconsin supreme court.