Legal News & Articles

A worker, Nash, injured his knee in the course and scope of employment and underwent two knee surgeries as a result: first a meniscectomy and, next, a total knee replacement. His doctor rated him with 5% permanent partial disability (PPD) for the meniscectomy and 50% PPD for the knee replacement. However, the employer’s insurance company only paid 45% PPD. Nash then filed an application for hearing alleging entitlement to 55% PPD. The ALJ sided with Nash, finding that under Daimler-Chrysler v. LIRC, 2007 WI 15, 299 Wis. 2d 1, 727 N.W.2d 311, cumulative PPD awards for multiple surgeries to the same body part necessitated by the same injury are allowed. The insurance company appealed to the LIRC, which affirmed the ALJ, then to the circuit court, which reversed the LIRC. LIRC then appealed to the court of appeals.

The plaintiff sued the defendant for legal malpractice in connection to his representation of it in a construction dispute, and the defendant counterclaimed for attorney fees. The construction dispute lawsuit had been dismissed as a sanction for spoliation of evidence. In the legal malpractice suit, the defendant moved for summary judgment on the grounds that because the plaintiff participated in the spoliation activities it should not be allowed to recover, under the doctrine of in pari delicto (a plaintiff who participatesin wrongdoing cannot recover damages resulting from that wrongdoing). The circuit court granted the defendant’s summary judgment, and the plaintiff appealed to the court of appeals which affirmed the circuit court.

The plaintiffs sued the defendants for exposure to carcinogenic chemicals allegedly released into a neighborhood where they lived. They did not allege that they had suffered adverse health effects as a result. Rather, they claimed that their exposure to the chemicals caused an increased risk of cancer and other diseases, and that their damages consisted of the need for increased medical monitoring and future tests. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiffs had failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted because they had not yet suffered an actual injury, which is required under Wisconsin law. The plaintiffs asserted that the chemicals coming into contact with their bodies constituted an assault or “affront to their bodies,” and thus they had grounds to pursue damages.

The plaintiff sued the defendants Cliff Bass and MRI Network Sales Consultants of Plantation for breach of contract, even though its contract was with a company named Rabrob Corp., of which Cliff Bass was managing director. The summons and complaint listing Mr. Bass and MRI Network Sales Consultants of Plantation as defendants was served upon Mr. Bass in his individual capacity and as “managing director” of MRI Network Sales Consultants of Plantation. Neither Mr. Bass nor MRI Network Sales Consultants of Plantation filed an answer, and the plaintiff moved for and received a default judgment against them. The defendants then moved to vacate the default judgment, arguing that the circuit court had no personal jurisdiction over them in relation to the claims made in the complaint because the contract was between the plaintiff and Rabrob Corp. The circuit court denied the defendants’ motion and they appealed to the court of appeals.

Here are links to last week's cases in html and pdf.

A worker, Wasmund, sustained a low back work injury on December 11, 2001, and she was paid worker’s compensation benefits. In 2007, she filed an application for prospective medical treatment, specifically surgical intervention. The worker’s compensation insurer denied the claim on the basis of IME reports and the claim proceeded to hearing where the ALJ found in favor of Wasmund and ordered the insurer to cover future treatment expense. The insurer appealed to the LIRC, arguing that Wis. Stat. sec. 102.18(1)(b)— the statute that authorizes orders for prospective medical treatment—did not apply to Wasmund’s injury because the statute became effective on January 1, 2002. As Wis. Stat. sec. 102.18(1)(b) is not listed in Wis. Stat. sec. 102.03(4) as an exception to the rule stated in that section that “the right to compensation and the amount of the compensation shall in all cases be determined in accordance with the provisions of law in effect as of the date of injury,” the insurer argued that the Department’s order was erroneous. Wasmund asserted that Wis. Stat. sec. 102.18(1)(b) was a procedural or remedial statute because it simply “improves or facilitates remedies already existing for the enforcement of rights and redress of injuries,” and that it could therefore be applied retroactively. The LIRC affirmed the ALJ and the insurer appealed to the circuit court, which affirmed the LIRC. The insurer appealed to the court of appeals.

The plaintiff was injured in an auto accident while in the course and scope of his employment and he received worker’s compensation benefits. He then sued the other driver. The worker’s compensation insurer joined as a subrogated plaintiff pursuant to Wis. Stat. sec. 102.29. Prior to trial the defendant offered to settle the case. When the plaintiff refused, the worker’s compensation insurer moved the court to compel the plaintiff to accept the offer, arguing that under Bergren v. Staples, 263 Wis. 477, 57 N.W.2d 714 (1953), the circuit court had discretion to order the plaintiff to accept the settlement offer. The plaintiff asserted that Bergren involved the converse of the situation here—where a plaintiff wanted to settle but the worker’s compensation insurer refused—and that he should therefore not be compelled to settle the case. The circuit court agreed with the worker’s compensation insurer and compelled the plaintiff to accept the defendant’s settlement offer, and the plaintiff appealed to the court of appeals.

Plaintiffs purchased a home which they felt was not habitable. They were in the process of renovating the home when it was destroyed in an explosion and fire. At the time of the fire, the plaintiffs had not yet spent the night in the home, though the court noted that they were on the property “almost daily”. The issue in the case was whether the home was an “occupied dwelling”, per Wis. Stat. sec. 632.05(2), which requires an insurer to pay the policy limits to an insured whose owned and occupied dwelling is totally destroyed.

The plaintiff sued the defendant for wrongful death. His son, with whom he had little contact, died while in the son’s mother’s vehicle allegedly due to the negligence of the mother. The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff could not maintain a wrongful death cause of action because he was estranged from and had abandoned his son. The plaintiff asserted that he did not voluntarily abandon his son but rather was prevented from ever seeing him by the mother’s family members, that he had attempted numerous times to become involved in his son’s life, and that he was in the process of saving money to hire a family law lawyer when his son died. The circuit court agreed with the defendant and granted summary judgment, holding that a father who is estranged from his child has no claim for loss of society and companionship and, therefore, no claim for wrongful death. The plaintiff appealed to the court of appeals.

The issue before the court was whether the claims made in the plaintiff’s amended complaint related back to the original complaint as the statute of limitations had passed. The plaintiff had fallen on the icy parking lot at a roller rink, Skateland. The plaintiff filed a complaint against Skateland as the operator of the roller rink within the statute of limitations. The complaint did not state any claims against the owner of the premises.